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MEMORANDUM FOR CIA

SUBJECT: NFIB Working Group for Review of Security Standards for
Personnel Clearances

Reference: Your verbal tasking of 6 March 1979.

1. While it is not anticipated that clearance authorities of the Defense Intelligence Agency will be affected quite as severely as those of the Military Departments by the adoption of procedures for access to and control of decompartmented intelligence (NFI/SLC), we anticipate comparable difficulties.
2. Since it is unlikely that the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) will be granted any increment in resources, we find it hard to imagine how it can handle a substantial increase in its workload no matter what additional investigative requirements are levied due to massive release of previously compartmented information. It is certainly our position that access to NFI/SLC should be based on a background investigation.
3. Protracted delays in BI completion time, even in a long-range, phased operation, will inevitably require frequent use of waiver provisions, which we consider unwise from a security standpoint.
4. The impact on DIA cannot be considered separate from that of the Military Departments since the majority of personnel security files we handle come from military or related activities, and almost all ultimately involve the DIS. In addition to providing collateral and SCI clearability for our own personnel, DIA is responsible for determining SCI eligibility for thousands of military members, civilian employees, consultants and contractors in OSD, OJCS and all the Defense agencies (less NSA).
5. The DoD components we support are satisfied with the adjudicative role of DIA and the briefing facilities we provide. Should similar support be required for NFI/SLC access, DIA would be unable to respond without significant increase in security resources.
6. Careful consideration of adjunctive administrative problems leads us to conclude that NFI/SLC access must be based on strict application of the "need-to-know" principle. Policy governing such administrative procedures as NFI/SLC briefing/debriefing, document control, distribution, storage, inter-office access, roster maintenance, etc., must be left to the head of each DoD agency or component. The enforcement of need-to-know would be less problematic to DIA, since nearly all DIA personnel are currently cleared to at least the Top Secret level.


JOHN E. BURNS
DIA Member

DIA review
completed.